Ronald Long v. Atlantic City Police Departmen by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-13-2012 
Ronald Long v. Atlantic City Police Departmen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Ronald Long v. Atlantic City Police Departmen" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1357. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1357 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 06-4732 
_____________ 
 
RONALD LONG, 
                  Appellant 
   v. 
 
ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
JAMES SCOPPA; ERNEST JUBILEE;  
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; 
NANCY J. TAYLOR; LAURA A. BARBATO, 
 
     
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 06-cv-00785) 
District Judge:  Hon. Noel L. Hillman 
_______________ 
 
Argued  
November 9, 2011 
 
Before:   RENDELL, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
2 
 
(File: February 13, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
Alexander Bilus   [ARGUED] 
Carolyn H. Feeney 
Dechert 
2929 Arch Street – 18th Fl. 
Philadelphia, PA   19104 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Matthew H. Duncan   [ARGUED] 
Fine, Kaplan & Black 
1835 Market Street - #2800 
Philadelphia, PA   19103 
          Amicus Curiae Counsel 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Ronald Long, a New Jersey state prisoner who 
proceeded pro se before the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, appeals an order of that Court 
denying his untimely motion for reconsideration of a prior 
order dismissing his complaint.  Long relies on Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), which provides that, if a 
timely motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e) is filed, the time to appeal begins to run from 
the district court’s disposition of the motion.  He reasons that, 
here, we can review the underlying dismissal order because 
his motion for reconsideration should be deemed timely since 
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mail delay within the prison caused him to file the motion 
late.   
 
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Long 
that, in cases where the record supports a finding of delay in 
prison mail delivery, such delay may make an untimely Rule 
59(e) motion timely so as to permit the exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction over an order we would otherwise lack 
jurisdiction to review.  When the record is insufficient to 
support a prisoner’s allegations of prison delay, we may 
remand to the District Court for appropriate fact-finding.  
Ultimately, however, we rule that the issue of delay need not 
be resolved on remand because we have jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s denial of reconsideration which, in this case, 
proves sufficient. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
On February 21, 2006, Long filed an in forma pauperis 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Atlantic City 
Police Department, the New Jersey State Police, two police 
officers, and two forensic chemists.  He alleged that the 
defendants conspired to obtain a capital murder conviction 
against him by knowingly presenting false evidence at his 
trial, and deliberately preventing him from obtaining DNA 
testing that would prove his innocence.1
                                              
1 In his own words, Long claimed that “the Defendants 
violated [his] constitutional and civil rights … by committing 
perjury and/or fabricating evidence and engaging in 
conspiratorial acts to hide evidence to prevent DNA testing, 
causing … [him] to be falsely convicted of capital murder.”  
(Amicus App. at 133; see also id. at 137 (alleging a 
  The complaint 
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sought monetary damages to compensate him for the 
consequences of the alleged conspiracy. 
 
On August 16, 2006, after screening the complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,2 the District 
Court issued a memorandum concluding that Long’s claims 
were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 
unless and until Long could demonstrate that his state court 
conviction was invalid.  Accordingly, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint sua sponte, even though the 
defendants had not yet been served.  The Court issued an 
accompanying order closing the case that same day.  On 
August 21, 2006, the memorandum and the order were 
entered on the District Court’s docket.  Thus, under the rules 
then in effect,3
                                                                                                     
conspiracy to “hide the evidence to prevent it from being 
DNA tested and to prevent … [Long] from being able to 
establish his innocence”).)  Citations to “Amicus App.” are to 
the Appendix filed by court-appointed Amicus, Fine, Kaplan 
& Black, R.P.C. (“Fine Kaplan”). 
 Long had until September 4, 2006 to file a 
2 Collectively, those provisions provide that district 
courts should screen civil complaints in which a prisoner 
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer, and 
dismiss the case if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) 
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) 
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 
from such relief.   
3 Currently, a “motion to alter or amend a judgment 
[under Rule 59(e)] must be filed no later than 28 days after 
the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and “all 
deadlines stated in days (no matter the length) are computed 
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motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(e) (stating the deadline by reference to the “entry 
of the judgment”).   
 
He did not do so.  Instead, on September 25, 2006, 
Long filed4 a motion for reconsideration along with a letter 
brief explaining that he had not received the District Court’s 
filings until September 22, 2006 – after the 30-day period to 
file an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) had lapsed.5
                                                                                                     
in the same way,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (Advisory Committee’s 
Notes on 2009 Amendments).  However, at the time Long’s 
case was before the District Court, a 10-day deadline applied, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2006), and time periods involving less 
than 11 days were calculated by excluding intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) 
(2006).  
  The 
motion for reconsideration claimed that the delay was caused, 
in part, by Long’s transfer from one state prison to another.  
Specifically, Long claimed that although he had informed the 
4 Long signed his motion on September 25, 2006, and 
it was entered on the District Court’s docket on October 2, 
2006.  Heeding the Supreme Court’s instruction in Houston v. 
Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), we presume, for purposes of our 
discussion, that Long filed his motion on the date he executed 
it.  See id. at 276 (“[T]he notice of appeal was filed at the 
time petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities for 
forwarding to the court clerk.”). 
5 While we will make references to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure simply as “Rules,” we will use the short-
hand “Appellate Rule” when referring to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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District Court of his transfer to a new prison, he received the 
District Court’s memorandum and order only after they were 
sent to his old prison and then forwarded to him.  He also 
attributed his delayed receipt of those documents to the fact 
that officials at his new prison “open Legal Mail outside of 
the inmate’s presence.”  (Amicus App. at 149.)  
 
On October 4, 2006, the District Court issued a 
memorandum treating Long’s motion for reconsideration as 
timely because he had “executed his motion on September 25, 
2006, within three days of receipt” (Amicus App. at 155), but 
rejecting Long’s motion for reconsideration on the merits, 
based on Heck.  The District Court’s memorandum, as well as 
its accompanying order, were entered on the docket on 
October 6, 2006.  On October 31, 2006, Long signed a notice 
of appeal that was therefore timely as measured from the 
denial of reconsideration, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) 
(providing that a notice of appeal must be filed within “30 
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” in a 
case in which the United States or its agent is not a party), but 
untimely as measured from the August 16, 2006 order 
dismissing the case.   
 
We consolidated Long’s appeal with other cases 
presenting similar issues implicating Appellate Rule 4(a) for 
the purpose of determining whether, and to what extent, we 
have appellate jurisdiction to consider it.6
                                              
6 Those other cases are Baker v. United States, Nos. 
08-2288 and 08-2365, Barner v. Williamson, No. 08-1025, 
and Cycle Chem, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-1320.  They are the 
subject of separate dispositions. 
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II. Discussion7
 
 
The parties agree that we have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s order denying Long’s motion for 
reconsideration.8
 
  Long contends that we also have 
jurisdiction to review the underlying dismissal order because 
his motion for reconsideration should, under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A), toll his time to file an appeal.  That Appellate 
Rule provides, in pertinent part, that certain “timely file[d]” 
post-judgment motions, including motions to reconsider 
under Rule 59(e), serve to postpone “the time to file an appeal 
… [until] the entry of the order disposing of the last … 
remaining motion.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).  Although 
Long acknowledges that his motion for reconsideration was 
late, he asks us to treat it as timely, due to the mail handling 
in prison that allegedly delayed his filing.   
Our Amicus, Fine Kaplan, takes a contrary view 
regarding Long’s attempt to appeal the underlying order of 
dismissal.  According to Amicus’s view of the law, when 
                                              
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).  We have appellate jurisdiction, if at 
all, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
8 Because none of the defendants named in Long’s 
complaint were served before his complaint was dismissed, 
those parties were not present to take a position on the 
jurisdictional questions presented in this appeal.  To facilitate 
our inquiry, we appointed Fine Kaplan to file an amicus brief 
on behalf of the Court, and Dechert LLP to file a brief on 
behalf of Long.  The Court is grateful for the superb 
assistance provided by those firms. 
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Long did not receive a copy of the District Court’s dismissal 
order until after the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of 
appeal had lapsed, his only recourse was to file a motion 
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) for an extension of time to 
appeal,9 or a motion under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen 
the time to file an appeal.10
 
  Because Long filed neither of 
those motions and instead filed a motion for reconsideration 
under Rule 59(e), Amicus argues that we lack jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s underlying dismissal order. 
                                              
9 Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) provides, in relevant part, that 
the district court “may extend the time to file a notice of 
appeal if” a party seeks an extension (1) no later than 30 days 
after the otherwise applicable appellate deadline; and (2) 
“shows excusable neglect or good cause.”  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii). 
10 Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) provides, in relevant part, 
that the district court “may reopen the time to file an appeal 
for a period of 14 days” if (1) the court determines the 
movant did not receive notice of the entry of the appealable 
order within 21 days of its entry; (2) the motion is filed in the 
earlier period of 180 days of the appealable order’s entry or 
14 days after the moving party receives notice; and (3) the 
court determines that no party would be prejudiced by 
reopening the time to appeal.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A)-(C). 
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A. Our Jurisdiction to Review the District Court’s 
Initial Dismissal Order 
 
We therefore begin our analysis by evaluating whether 
we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order 
dismissing Long’s complaint.  That inquiry leads us to 
examine two distinct questions.   
 
First, we address whether allegations of prison delay 
can excuse the untimeliness of a motion to reconsider under 
Rule 59(e) so as to permit us to exercise jurisdiction under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to review the underlying dismissal.  
If an untimely Rule 59(e) motion can be considered “timely” 
as a result of prison delay, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) permits 
“the time to file an appeal [to] run[] … from the entry of the 
order disposing of … [that] motion.”  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4)(A).  Second, assuming Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) does 
provide an avenue for us to reach the underlying dismissal 
order, we consider whether there is a temporal limitation on 
the operation of that rule that would prevent its application in 
circumstances where a Rule 59(e) motion is filed after the 
otherwise applicable time period for filing a notice of appeal, 
see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), has lapsed. 
 
We address those questions in turn. 
 
1. Whether Prison Delay Can Render an 
Untimely Rule 59(e) Motion Timely 
The idea that prison delay may serve to toll the time to 
appeal stems from our holding in United States v. Grana, 864 
F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by 
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2010).  
10 
 
There, we held that delay by prison authorities in delivering 
mail to a prisoner should be excluded in calculating the time 
for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case.  See id. at 313.  
Although the prisoner in Grana filed a pro se appeal “fifteen 
days out of time” under Appellate Rule 4(b), Grana alleged 
that the prison had “negligently handled his incoming mail, 
and as a result he did not receive the district court’s final 
order until May 5, 1988, after the expiration of the appeal 
period.”  Id. at 314.  He consequently argued that, for 
purposes of jurisdiction, his appeal should be treated as 
having been filed on time.  We agreed. 
 
Pointing to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the prison 
mailbox rule,11
                                              
11 As mentioned supra note 
 we observed that “prison delay beyond the 
litigant’s control cannot fairly be used in computing time for 
appeal” and we “perceive[d] no difference between delay in 
transmitting the prisoner’s papers to the court and 
transmitting the court’s final judgment to him so that he may 
prepare his appeal.”  Id. at 316.  We therefore held that, “in 
computing the timeliness of pro se prisoners’ appeals, any 
prison delay in transmitting to the prisoner notice of the 
district court’s final order or judgment shall be excluded from 
the computation of an appellant’s time for taking an appeal.”  
Id.  We remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether the appeal was timely under that standard because 
“the record d[id] not show the date the prison received notice 
of the district court’s final order or conclusively establish the 
4, the Supreme Court has 
held that a prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed upon 
delivery to the prison mail system.  See Houston, 487 U.S. at 
276.  A variation of that rule is currently embodied in 
Appellate Rule 4(c). 
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date the prison transmitted the notice to [the] appellant.”  Id.  
We instructed that, on remand, the prison would have “the 
burden … of establishing the relevant dates” because the 
prison was best equipped to provide that information.  Id. 
 
In United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 
2003), we extended the Grana rule to permit an untimely 
motion for reconsideration to be made timely so that it would, 
in turn, toll the time to appeal under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A).  Fiorelli filed a civil case under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255,12
                                              
12 After first observing that the time to appeal an order 
entered on a § 2255 motion is governed by Appellate Rule 
4(a), we began our tolling discussion in Fiorelli by evaluating 
“the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
[Fiorelli’s] § 2255 motion.”  Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 285.  We 
stated that we were considering “the requirement under Civil 
Rule 58 that judgments be set forth on a separate document 
and entered in the docket of the district clerk, and the time 
limitations accompanying motions for reconsideration under 
Civil Rules 59 and 60,” id. at 286; we concluded that those 
civil rules applied in the § 2255 context, see id. at 286-87; 
and we proceeded to evaluate whether Fiorelli’s untimely 
motion under Rule 59(e) could permit his appeal to be 
properly filed under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A), see id. at 287-
88. 
 mounting a collateral attack on his criminal 
conviction.  Id. at 284.  His claim for relief was denied by the 
district court on April 9, 2001.  Id. at 285.  On April 30, 2001, 
outside of the then-applicable 10-day period for filing a 
motion for reconsideration but within the 60-day period for 
filing a notice of appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) 
(providing that a notice of appeal must be filed within “60 
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days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” in a 
case in which the United States or its agent is a party), he 
filed what the Fiorelli court ultimately construed as a Rule 
59(e) motion for reconsideration, Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 285, 
288.  The district court denied that motion on May 18, 2001, 
and Fiorelli filed a notice of appeal on July 17, 2001.  Id.   
 
Thus, as in this case, Fiorelli’s notice of appeal was 
timely as measured from the denial of the untimely motion 
for reconsideration, but was otherwise untimely.  Fiorelli 
alleged, however, that he received the district court’s original 
order “during the normal mail distribution at the federal 
prison where he [was] confined,” 13 days after the district 
court issued the order denying his § 2255 claim.  Id. at 288 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The question, therefore, 
was whether Fiorelli’s delayed receipt of the original order, 
which delay was allegedly caused by prison officials, should 
result in his untimely motion for reconsideration being 
viewed as timely, thereby rendering his appeal of the original 
order denying his § 2255 claim timely under the provisions of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  See id. (“Fiorelli’s appeal may be 
properly filed if his motion for reconsideration is deemed 
timely, thus invoking the tolling provision of Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A).”).   
 
We answered that there was “no reason why Grana’s 
exclusion of prison delays from the time limits of 
jurisdictionally sensitive filings should not apply to motions 
for reconsideration,” inasmuch as such deadlines are “critical 
to appellate jurisdiction.”  Id. at 289.  It followed that “a 
prison’s actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final 
order of the district court is excluded from the calculation of 
the timeliness of motions for reconsideration … filed by pro 
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se inmates.”  Id. at 289-90.  While we emphasized that the 
tolling rule requires a prisoner to allege that actual delay or 
interference in mail delivery was caused by the prison, we 
were satisfied that Fiorelli’s “statement that he received the 
District Court’s order during the normal mail distribution” 
could refer to such interference and remanded for the district 
court to determine whether the tolling rule could be properly 
invoked.  Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As 
we did in Grana, we instructed the district court to undertake 
factual findings as to “the relevant dates of the prison’s 
receipt and delivery of the District Court’s order” so that, on 
review, we could make a “determination of our jurisdiction.”  
Id. 
 
Notwithstanding Fiorelli’s extension of the Grana 
tolling principle to a case governed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Appellate Rule 4(a), we seemed to reject 
that approach in Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 
368 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004).  In Poole, a pro se prisoner filed 
an untimely notice of appeal, “apparently because of delay in 
receiving notice of the entry of the order dismissing his 
claims.”  Id. at 264.  Citing Grana, Poole argued that “his 
[otherwise untimely] notice of appeal should be regarded as 
having been filed on time because there was a delay in his 
receipt of notice from the district court clerk’s office 
regarding the entry of the order of dismissal.”  Id.  That delay 
was allegedly the result of “Poole’s transfer from one 
correctional institution to another shortly before the order of 
dismissal was entered.”13
                                              
13 More specifically, the delay in Poole occurred 
because the clerk’s office mailed the notice to a prison where, 
by the time the letter arrived, Poole was no longer 
  Id. at 264-65.  Without mentioning 
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Fiorelli, we concluded that the Grana tolling rule did not 
apply, distinguishing Poole’s appeal because it – unlike the 
appeal in Grana – occurred in a civil case, id. at 265-66, and 
because “the delay was not primarily due to Poole’s status as 
an inmate but to the simple fact that he was moved,” id. at 
266 n.4.  Poole’s proper remedy, we explained, would have 
been to file a motion to reopen in accordance with Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(6).  See id. at 266-67. 
 
While Poole is plainly in tension with Fiorelli, we 
view the holding in Poole as turning not on its distinction 
between criminal and civil cases but rather on the nature of 
the alleged delay.  In Fiorelli, the delay in the prisoner’s 
receipt of the order was allegedly the result of the prison’s 
handling of the mail.  It was, in other words a classic prison 
delay case, after the manner of Grana.  In Poole, by contrast, 
the delay allegedly was caused by the clerk’s office and did 
not stem from actions or omissions by prison officials.   Cf. 
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 289 (“Grana makes clear that only 
                                                                                                     
incarcerated.  Poole, 368 F.3d at 265.  Poole had sent two 
letters to the district court concerning his change in address.  
The first, received just before the order was mailed to him, 
stated that Poole would be “returning to P.A. 3-24-02 is my 
Max out date and then my detainer come up.”  Id.  It did not 
contain any Pennsylvania address or request a change in 
address.  The second letter, received just after the order was 
sent, contained Poole’s new address but “did not state 
expressly that Poole’s address had changed and did not 
request that the clerk change the address listed on the docket.”  
Id.  As a result, it did not alert the clerk’s office that the order 
“sent a few days earlier had been mailed to a facility where 
Poole was no longer housed.”  Id. 
15 
 
delays caused by the prison warrant tolling of the filing 
deadlines, and ‘[t]o the extent that the delay represents slow 
mail, there is nothing that this Court can do to preserve an 
appellant’s right to appellate review.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Grana, 864 F.2d at 316)).   
 
We therefore read Fiorelli to articulate a still-
controlling rule that applies when delay is allegedly caused by 
actions or omissions of prison officials in the delivery of mail 
to a prisoner litigating pro se.14  We reaffirm that we can view 
a Rule 59(e) motion as timely in such situations, allowing us 
to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) 
over an appeal of the underlying case-dispositive order, if the 
delay in filing the Rule 59(e) motion is caused by “a prison’s 
actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final order of 
the district court.”15
                                              
14 We note that in Fiorelli the pro se prisoner 
attempted to toll the deadline for filing a motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) so as to permit an appeal in 
accordance with Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  In Poole, by 
contrast, the pro se prisoner attempted to toll the deadline for 
filing a notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1).  Given 
recent Supreme Court precedent, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 
U.S. 205 (2007), that distinction may be a significant one.  
However, as discussed infra in Part II.A.2, the question of 
whether prison delay tolling principles are applicable to 
deadlines that are jurisdictional in character, such as 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(1), is not implicated in this case because 
Long seeks only to have us deem his Rule 59(e) motion 
timely. 
  Id. at 289.  Thus, when a pro se prisoner 
15 That is not to say, of course, that a pro se prisoner 
who experiences mail delay does not have other avenues that 
16 
 
makes allegations in connection with a motion for 
reconsideration that could reasonably be construed as a non-
frivolous assertion that the prison delayed delivering the court 
order that he is asking be reconsidered, the district court 
should engage in the fact-finding necessary to a jurisdictional 
analysis under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  See id. (“The 
timeliness of a motion under … Civil Rule 59 … is critical to 
appellate jurisdiction.”).  In some instances, such as when the 
prisoner’s allegations are uncontested, the district court may 
of course choose to credit what the prisoner says.  There 
ought, however, also be some effort to confirm that the order 
was sent to the prisoner’s correct prison address and an 
explicit determination that the prisoner’s allegations as to the 
date of receipt are accepted as being true.16
                                                                                                     
can serve to preserve his or her appellate rights.  Appellate 
Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6), see supra notes 
  We then, in turn, 
9-10, both provide 
means to do so, and are undoubtedly a more direct route to 
securing access to an appellate courtroom.  Cf. Poole, 368 
F.3d at 266-67 (discussing requirements for relief under 
Appellate Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6)).  Indeed, when 
confronted with his delayed receipt of the District Court’s 
memorandum and order in this case, Long would have been 
far better served by filing one of those motions rather than the 
motion for reconsideration he instead filed, as our ability to 
review the District Court’s initial order of dismissal turns on 
whether his allegations of prison delay can be credited.   
16 Because the timeliness of a motion for 
reconsideration implicates our power to hear an appeal under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A), a bare statement that the prisoner’s 
allegations are assumed to be true will not do.  Some kind of 
fact-finding is essential.  We note, moreover, that making 
assumptions about timeliness could be viewed as an extension 
17 
 
would accept any such fact-finding as long as it was not 
clearly erroneous.  Even when the district court determines it 
needs further information to decide whether the prison 
actually delayed or interfered with a prisoner’s receipt of an 
order, we are not suggesting that a hearing will be necessary; 
we are instead directing only that, in such a case, the prison 
has the burden of providing evidence of the date it received 
the district court’s final order and the date on which it was 
transmitted to the appellant.  See Grana, 864 F.2d at 316.  As 
a practical matter, this should add no burden to prison record-
keeping because prison officials have, at least since Grana, 
been on notice that they should maintain “clear and accurate 
mail logs.”  Id. 
 
In the present case, Long certified17
                                                                                                     
of time to file a motion for reconsideration.  That would be 
inappropriate, given the explicit instruction in Rule 6 that 
time extensions for certain motions, including motions 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), are forbidden.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
6(b)(2) (“A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 
50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).”).  District 
courts should of course heed that direction and hew strictly to 
the stated time limits, unless there is prison delay that serves 
as a basis for treating an untimely motion as timely. 
 that his delayed 
receipt of the District Court’s memorandum and order was a 
result of two things: first, that those documents were 
incorrectly mailed to his old prison, and second, that his new 
17 Long supported his allegations with a certification 
that stated his view of the  facts and contained an averment 
that “a willfully false statement [would] subject [him] to 
punishment.”  (Amicus App. at 150.)   
18 
 
prison opened legal mail before delivering it to prisoners.  
Thus, although some portion of the delay was allegedly 
caused by the District Court’s clerk’s office and any such 
time lost would not count towards making Long’s untimely 
motion for reconsideration timely, some of the delay was also 
allegedly a consequence of prison delay, as Long complains 
of his new prison’s practice of opening legal mail before 
sending it to inmates.  We cannot sort out these alleged 
sources of delay, however, because the District Court made 
no express finding as to whether the prison actually delayed 
or interfered with Long’s receipt of its order, and the record 
before us does not indicate when the prison where Long 
currently resides received the District Court’s memorandum 
and order or when it transmitted those documents to Long.  
We would therefore ordinarily remand to the District Court to 
find those facts. 
 
2. Whether There is a Temporal Limitation 
on Fiorelli’s Tolling Rule 
Our Amicus, however, indicates that remand would be 
fruitless here since there is a 30-day outer time limit (or 60-
day, when the United States or its agent is a party) on 
Fiorelli’s tolling rule because Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) imposes 
that jurisdictional time limit on the filing of a notice of 
appeal.  Amicus’s argument is based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).  In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that timing requirements for 
filing notices of appeal, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and 
from which Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) is derived, are mandatory 
and jurisdictional, and, as such, a court has no power to create 
equitable exceptions to them.  551 U.S. at 214.  As we discuss 
more fully in the companion case filed today, Baker v. United 
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States, Nos. 08-2288 and 08-2365, there is no doubt after 
Bowles that the rules listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, one of which 
is restated in Appellate Rule 4(a)(1), are jurisdictional.18
                                              
18 Though the subject of discussion at oral argument, 
we need not consider whether Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is 
likewise jurisdictional, or instead, a claims-processing rule.  
Although we similarly did not resolve that issue in Lizardo v. 
United States, 619 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2010), that decision 
implies that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing 
rule because it – much like Rule 59(e) (and unlike Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(1)) – does not appear in a statute and was 
promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.  See Lizardo, 619 
F.3d at 277 (“Rule 59(e) is akin to Rule 4004 of the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.  Both rules were 
promulgated by the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling 
Act.”).  We do note, however, that, a conclusion that 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing rule would 
not prevent us from dismissing, sua sponte, untimely appeals 
filed under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  See United States v. 
Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
that, where “a rule implicates judicial interests beyond those 
of the parties, it may be appropriate for a court to invoke the 
rule sua sponte in order to protect those interests,” and 
holding that the court had the power to enforce claims-
processing rules by way of a sua sponte dismissal).  In fact, 
given the administrative and institutional interests in 
enforcing appellate deadlines notwithstanding the parties’ 
actions before us, a persuasive argument can be made that sua 
sponte dismissal should be the rule rather than the exception.  
See id. at 754 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (“I would dismiss 
almost all untimely appeals, regardless of whether an appellee 
forfeits its objection by not properly raising it.”).   
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Because of that, and because Fiorelli tolling can permit a 
litigant entitled to its application to file a notice of appeal 
from the original order after Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)’s 
jurisdictional deadline has lapsed, our Amicus has taken the 
position that Fiorelli cannot allow an untimely motion for 
reconsideration to be deemed timely for purposes of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) if that motion is filed after the 
expiration of the 30- or 60-day jurisdictional period for filing 
a notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1).  Were we to 
hold otherwise, Amicus warns, we would be allowing, and 
perhaps encouraging, an end-run around Appellate Rule 
4(a)(1)’s jurisdictional deadline.  
 
But Amicus’s argument is misplaced.  Properly 
viewed, the Fiorelli tolling rule does not extend any of the 
deadlines set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Appellate Rule 
4(a)(1).  Rather, it concerns the “timeliness” of a motion for 
reconsideration, which then determines, under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A), the orders over which we can exercise 
jurisdiction.  When facts are found that demonstrate prison 
delay, all that Fiorelli does is allow us to, by excluding the 
time lost due to prison delay, deem as timely what would 
otherwise be an untimely motion for reconsideration.  After 
subtracting such time, the prisoner must still file his appeal 
within 30 (or 60) days of the district court’s disposition of his 
motion.  If he does so, he will be considered to have properly 
filed his appeal in accordance with Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  
Fiorelli’s tolling rule is nothing more than an application of 
the principle from Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) that 
time lost due to prison delay “cannot fairly be used in 
computing time for appeal.”  Grana, 864 F.2d at 316. 
 
21 
 
It is quite possible, then, that, after fact-finding by the 
District Court, we could conclude that we do have jurisdiction 
to consider the District Court’s underlying order that 
dismissed Long’s complaint.  Our usual practice would 
therefore be to remand for the District Court to find the facts 
that “are essential for a determination of our jurisdiction” 
over that order.  Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 290.  That step is 
unnecessary in this case, however, since we agree with the 
parties that we have jurisdiction to consider Long’s appeal to 
the extent he challenges the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for reconsideration,19
 
 which proves sufficient in this 
case.  
 B. The District Court’s Denial of Reconsideration 
 
We acknowledge that our review of the order denying 
reconsideration is subject to a more deferential and 
circumscribed standard of review than would apply if we also 
                                              
19 Earlier precedent considered any “sub[s]tantive 
action a court takes on an untimely motion … a nullity.”  
Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858, 861 
(3d Cir. 1970).  More recent authority, however, establishes 
that we “can no longer treat Rule 59(e) as a jurisdictional 
rule, nor view … [an] untimely motion for reconsideration as 
a nullity.”  Lizardo, 619 F.3d at 277.  It logically follows that 
a district court’s action on such a motion can, likewise, not be 
deemed a nullity, and we therefore have jurisdiction to review 
a timely appealed order disposing of an untimely motion for 
reconsideration.  However, because any such order is 
appealable in its own right, the filing fee waiver provided for 
in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(iii) does not apply to a notice of 
appeal challenging the disposition of the untimely motion. 
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were to have jurisdiction to consider the underlying dismissal 
order, as we review only whether the District Court’s denial 
of reconsideration constitutes an abuse of discretion.20
                                              
20 If we had jurisdiction to consider the underlying 
order, we would exercise plenary review to determine 
whether the District Court properly dismissed Long’s 
complaint.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Some cases intimate that our review of an 
order denying reconsideration is, likewise, plenary to the 
extent that “the denial of reconsideration is predicated on an 
issue of law.”  Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); see N. River Ins. 
Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Where a district court’s denial of a motion to 
reconsider is based upon the interpretation of legal precepts, 
however, our review of the lower court’s decision is 
plenary.”).  That idea, however, stems from the understanding 
that “an appeal from a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration 
brings up the underlying judgment for review,” McAlister v. 
Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348-49 (3d 
Cir. 1986)), which is only true to the extent that Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(4)(A) allows “the time to file an appeal [to] run[] 
for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of” a 
timely filed Rule 59 motion, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v); 
see Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 
F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982) (“A timely appeal from an order 
denying a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend brings up the 
underlying judgment for review.” (citing Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4))).  Thus, when there is no timely filed post-judgment 
motion to trigger Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)’s tolling 
provisions and when an appeal is untimely as measured from 
  See, 
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e.g., Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he appropriate standard of review [of an appeal from the 
district court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion] is for an abuse of 
discretion.”).  Consequently, in the ordinary case, we would 
not assume that reviewing a denial of reconsideration would 
be functionally the same as reviewing the underlying order, 
even if the former covered all of the same issues as the latter.   
 
However, though we are bound by an abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing the denial of reconsideration, 
it would indeed be an abuse of discretion in this case if the 
District Court were wrong in saying that Heck required 
dismissal of Long’s complaint.  See Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of the State of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 265 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“[A] court abuses its discretion when its 
ruling is founded on an error of law or a misapplication of 
law to the facts.” (internal citation omitted)).  Thus, even 
though we cannot conclude on this record whether we have 
jurisdiction to exercise plenary review to consider whether 
the District Court erred in dismissing Long’s complaint, the 
legal question presented is essentially the same under either 
plenary or abuse-of-discretion review: whether the District 
Court correctly found Long’s complaint to be barred by Heck. 
 
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 suit 
should be dismissed when a “judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence … unless the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”  
512 U.S. at 487.  Here, Long’s complaint seeks the sort of 
                                                                                                     
the underlying judgment, we cannot exercise plenary review 
over an order disposing of a motion for reconsideration. 
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relief that is plainly barred by Heck because he seeks § 1983 
relief on the ground that the defendants conspired to obtain a 
capital murder conviction against him, but he has not 
demonstrated that his conviction has already been invalidated.  
(See Amicus App. at 133 (alleging that “the Defendants 
violated [Long’s] constitutional and civil rights … by 
committing perjury and/or fabricating evidence and engaging 
in conspiratorial acts to hide evidence to prevent DNA 
testing, causing … [Long] to be falsely convicted of capital 
murder”).)  Although the Supreme Court has clarified that 
Heck does not bar a litigant from seeking access to DNA 
evidence through § 1983, see Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 
1289, 1298 (2011), the conspiracy described in Long’s 
complaint does not, even liberally construed, seek such relief.   
 
Therefore, we hold that the District Court committed 
no legal error in denying Long’s motion for reconsideration, 
and so did not abuse its discretion in declining to change its 
order dismissing Long’s complaint.  And because the same 
result would obtain were we to ultimately determine that we 
have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s dismissal 
order, we need not remand for Fiorelli fact-finding. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
